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Since the Soviet Union's demise in December 1991 and the emergence of 15 
independent states in its place, many have hailed the end of the Cold War and the end 
of Soviet imperialism. Initially, President Boris Yel'tsin's administration announced that 
the goal of Russia's foreign policy would no longer be to impose Moscow's domination 
upon other peoples, as had been the case during the Soviet period. At first, Yel'tsin was 
also an adamant supporter of full independence not just for Russia, but for all of the 
Soviet republics; prior to the Soviet Union's disintegration, he even advocated self-
determination for any of the non-Russian nationalities which wanted genuine autonomy 
from the RSFSR. (1) However, less than one year after Russia and the fourteen other 
Soviet republics had become sovereign states, Russia was once again on the brink of 
becoming involved militarily in another country's domestic affairs. That country was the 
newly independent state of Tajikistan.
By early September 1992, Tajikistan was in the first stages of a particularly violent and 
destructive civil war. Some Russian troops were already stationed there, left over from 
Soviet border contingents whose purpose had been to guard the Tajik-Afghan frontier 
against weapons and drug smuggling. At the request of the new Tajik coalition 
government, more Russian border troops were sent. In the beginning these troops were 
declared to be a neutral force, whose main task was to safeguard important military and 
industrial installations and to act as peacekeepers. However, soon it became obvious 
that many of the Russian troops were aiding the pro-Communist rebel forces of former 
president Rakhmon Nabiev by selling or giving them Russian weapons and military 
supplies, a fact which was corroborated by Western journalists. Before the end of 
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October 1992, Nabiev's supporters were able to regain control of Dushanbe and to force 
the resignation of the coalition government. (2) Since then, the Russian troops' main 
function has been to keep the pro-Communist government, headed by Emomali 
Rahmonov (Nabiev's successor), in power in Dushanbe, and to try to gain back the rest 
of the country's territory from those who oppose him.
It is estimated that Rahmonov's government is in control of only about 15-20% of 
Tajikistan's territory, while the opposition controls approximately 50%. (3) Without the 
support of Russian military forces, Rahmonov's government would most assuredly 
collapse. In fact, Moscow still is in virtually complete control of the Tajik economy, 
because there was not enough time before the civil war broke out to dismantle the old 
Soviet economic structures in Tajikistan. The old relationships between the Tajik 
ministries which control the military elements and the KGB, as well as the other Moscow 
"power ministries," are also still in force. (4) Thus, it could be said that those parts of 
Tajikistan which are under government control constitute Russia's first post-
independence colony.
The Russian government maintained the fiction of neutrality vis-a-vis the civil war in 
Tajikistan until February 1993, when it pledged quite openly its continued assistance to 
the Tajik Communists until the end of the century, following the signing of cooperative 
defense agreements between the governments of Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 
(5) 
Conceivably, Moscow's initial motivation for becoming involved in Tajikistan's civil war 
may have been concern for the Russian minority residing in or near Dushanbe. During 
the demonstrations of 1991, many of the leaders of the various Tajik opposition groups 
(6) undertook not only to assure Dushanbe's Russian population of their goodwill, but 
also to appeal for support from that minority in forcing the old Communist government to 
establish a democracy and to respect basic civil rights. However, as Nabiev and his 
supporters maintained total control over the media, they were able to portray the 
members of the opposition as radical Muslims and Tajik nationalists who were hostile to 
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all non-Tajiks (including not only Russians, but Uzbeks, Tatars, Koreans, and others). 
This frightened many of Dushanbe's Russian population, and caused them to adhere to 
the Communist government. (7)
The main reason for Russia's support of the Tajik Communist forces, however, has been 
the preservation of the political and economic status quo in Central Asia as a whole. 
Moscow's case is that civil strife and economic and political chaos in Central Asia could 
cause large numbers of refugees to flee to Russia, straining its own economy even 
further, as well as putting the Russian stake in Central Asian energy resources at risk. 
Furthermore, Russia still enjoys a fairly lucrative trade relationship with all of the Central 
Asian republics, due to a number of special commercial privileges, some of which have 
been embodied in CIS agreements. The potential for Russia's trade with Central Asia 
and for Russian participation in the development of Central Asia's energy resources 
looks very bright, but only if the region remains under Russian control.
The alleged danger upon which Russian and many Western politicians harp most often, 
however, is the threat of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia, via Iran, 
Pakistan, and, most recently, Afghanistan. It is claimed that Islamic fundamentalism 
would engender severe civil strife and religious terrorism throughout Central Asia, and 
then presumably in Russia, were its supporters to gain power in Tajikistan. Therefore, 
Russia's support of the Tajik Communist Party is interpreted as support for the 
continued existence of a secular government in Tajikistan which acts as a safeguard 
against the forces of Islamic fundamentalism.
On a more realistic note, it is also distinctly possible that, had the opposition forces 
been allowed to take control of the government in Tajikistan, similar opposition groups in 
the other Central Asian republics might have gained the strength to begin putting real 
pressure on their own governments to make concessions in the area of human rights 
and political freedom. Uzbekistan, under Islom Karimov's leadership, would be 
particularly vulnerable to pressure for democratization, partly due to its geographic 
proximity to Tajikistan, but also in reaction to Karimov's absolute ban on political 
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opposition of any kind and harsh persecution of all government critics. A free, 
democratic government in Tajikistan could threaten Karimov's own hold on power.
This is at least one of the reasons for Uzbekistan's intervention on the side of the pro-
Communist forces in the Tajik civil war. It is important also to note that many of the 
members of the Tajik Communist government come from Khujand (formerly Leninobod), 
a region in northern Tajikistan which borders Uzbekistan and which has a substantial 
Uzbek population. In fact, under Soviet rule, Tajikistan's leadership traditionally was 
chosen from among the Khujand elite, many of whom were reputed to be Uzbeks. (8) 
Therefore, Karimov may see his support of the Tajik Communist government as a way 
of maintaining Uzbek political hegemony over Tajikistan.
In addition to fearing the twin specters of Islam and democracy in Tajikistan, Karimov 
has a third cause for worry; namely the dispute over the location of the Uzbek-Tajik 
border. The origins of this dispute are to be found in the mid-1920s, when the Uzbek 
SSR first came into being, and the Bolshevik authorities decided to include such 
ethnically Tajik population centers as Samarqand, Bukhara, and parts of Ferghana 
within Uzbekistan's borders. These cities and their surrounding oblasts were not only 
important cultural centers with Tajik majorities, but they also contained fertile land and 
water sources. Tajik Communist Party members lobbied hard for many years to have 
these areas returned to Tajikistan, until most of them were executed in Stalin's first wave 
of purges.(9)
In the early 1990s a small faction of Tajiks once again began to call for the redrawing of 
the Uzbek-Tajik border, and Tajik national consciousness in Uzbekistan began to grow. 
Tajiks residing in Uzbekistan started a movement to establish Tajik-language schools for 
their children and many Tajiks were willing to identify themselves as such on their 
internal passports. (10) Karimov responded to this movement with repressive measures, 
viewing it as a source of serious instability and a challenge to his government, 
especially if it were to begin receiving support from opposition forces in Tajikistan. 
Lending military support to the leaders of the old Tajik Communist regime, then, was 
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another way in which to ensure that Tajik nationalism and political opposition to the 
Uzbek government were squelched. 
The intensification of the conflict in Afghanistan last fall, with the Taleban's victory in 
Kabul, alarmed both Russian and Central Asian leaders, and caused them to reevaluate 
their policies toward the Tajik civil war. The leaders of Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan met at an emergency summit in Almaty in October 1996 in 
order to discuss ways in which to respond to the Taleban's victory and how to handle 
further the conflict in Tajikistan. It was decided to send Russian reinforcements to the 
Tajik-Afghan border, raising the number of troops there to 20,000, as well as to send a 
Central Asian "peacekeeping force" to the region. (11) Russian and Central Asian 
leaders have professed fears that the Taleban will not be satisfied with extending its rule 
over all of Afghanistan, but has designs on Central Asia as well, and could combine its 
forces with those of the Tajik opposition in order to achieve this goal. President Karimov 
has admitted to providing General Abdul Rashid Dostum (an ethnic Uzbek who currently 
controls most of Northern Afghanistan) with "humanitarian aid," supplying his forces with 
electricity, and is suspected of providing him with military aid as well. (12)
Russia had been driving against the Tajik opposition forces on two fronts: from within 
Tajikistan itself, but also from Afghanistan, where groups of opposition fighters had 
established bases from which they launched their attacks against the Tajik government. 
In September 1996 Russia managed to convince the Afghan President Mohammed 
Rabbani to sign an agreement on military cooperation against the United Tajik 
Opposition. A "security zone" was established which would allow Russian border troops 
to go as far as 25 kilometers across the Tajik-Afghan border into Afghanistan in pursuit 
of Tajik opposition fighters. Afghan government troops were to attack the Tajik 
opposition forces from the other side, and catch them in the crossfire. Afghan 
government troops were also to try to destroy Tajik opposition bases within this "security 
zone." In return, Rabbani's government was to receive further financial and military aid 
from Russia, which was supposed to enable his supporters to withstand the Taleban's 
forces and, at the very least, to maintain control over Kabul. (13) Two weeks later, the 
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Taleban took over Kabul, and, by the end of October, the Russian government had 
changed its tactics again and was pressuring President Rahmonov to pursue serious 
peace negotiations with the United Tajik Opposition.
While at present Russia's and Uzbekistan's interests do not appear to be in conflict--
both governments are alarmed by the Taleban's advances in Afghanistan, and agree 
that the civil conflicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan must be contained--Turkmenistan 
seems to be pursuing its own path, which could lead to an escalation of conflict for all 
concerned. Turkmen President Niyazov (a/k/a Turkmenbashi) was the only Central 
Asian head of state who did not attend the emergency summit meeting in Almaty in 
October 1996, and so far he is the only one who has not only refused to condemn the 
Taleban, but has denounced the other Central Asian leaders' criticism of that Afghan 
movement. Shortly after the emergency meeting in Almaty, a spokesperson for the 
Turkmen embassy in Moscow also stated that the Taleban had offered security 
guarantees for the planned construction of a $2 billion natural gas pipeline that is to run 
from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan. (14) The US oil company Unocal, in 
partnership with Saudi Arabia's Delta Oil Company, is leading a consortium composed 
of Russia's Gazprom company, Turkmenistan's Turkmenrusgaz company, (15) and 
unnamed Japanese and Pakistani partners, to undertake the project. (16) Although 
Unocal expects the current Afghan conflict and the absence of stable government in 
Kabul to slow down the process of raising sufficient funds for the pipeline's construction 
(financial arrangements are expected to be completed in the next three years), 
company representatives said that they had been in contact with all of the factions 
involved in the conflict, and had received written agreements from seven of them, 
recognizing Unocal's leading role in the pipeline construction consortium. (17) Company 
spokesmen also stated that they would be willing to provide "peace dividends" in the 
form of humanitarian aid to the various factions involved in the Afghan conflict, in return 
for their guarantees of the pipeline's safety. (18) The pipeline is to be completed by the 
year 2000, and is to run from Herat in the northwest to Kandahar in the south before 
entering Pakistan. (19)
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Although there is no evidence that the Turkmen government has directly supplied the 
Taleban with military aid, the Russian press has claimed that the Taleban entered Kabul 
on Ukrainian tanks whose point of entry into Afghanistan has been traced to the 
Turkmen-Afghan border. (20) The Turkmen government has denied these charges 
vehemently, stating that Turkmenistan is a neutral territory and therefore does not 
permit arms shipments of any kind across its territory. (21)
Thus, not just Russia, but also Uzbekistan and, most recently, Turkmenistan, are using 
the civil conflicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan to try to extend their influence beyond the 
borders of their own states. Again, there are signs of empire-building in a part of the 
world that has too often been the battleground for major powers in their grab for 
hegemony. In this case, however, regional players are struggling over what might seem 
to be relatively unimportant issues in the eyes of outsiders. Because the interests of 
these minor powers conflict and they are willing to use military force in order to achieve 
their goals, and given Russian armed intervention, Central Asia has become a 
battlefield. In addition there is a potential for Iranian and Pakistani involvement in a 
region that cries out for development, not warfare.
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